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The paper investigates different implications of theoretical models for hierarchical structure. 
A sample of 6578 firms in the Brazilian manufacturing industry is considered and explanatory 
factors pertaining structural characteristics, network technology, technological innovations, 
managerial innovations and Incentive mechanisms are investigated. Important joint effects are 
detected for all groups of variables in partial contrast with the related previous literature. 
Moreover, one detects significant joint effect of the newly considered group of incentive 
mechanisms variables. The evidence in terms of individual effects is largely consistent with 
the predicted effects from the theoretical literature on hierarchy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Traditional microeconomic analysis often considers the firm as a black box 
identified with a production function. The growing complexity of firms operating in 
very dynamic markets renders the investigation of different aspects of the 
organization of firms as especially relevant. 
A central issue with regard to the economics of internal organization of the 
firms [see Hölmstrom and Tirole (1989) and Milgrom and Roberts (1992) for 
extensive surveys], refers to the hierarchical design. That structural feature - the 
hierarchy, its levels, the span of control of managers and superiors - conditions, to 
a great extent, the performance of firms. Reflects also the range of job 
opportunities and allocation of workers, as well as the spectrum of wage 
differentials.  More generally, it is a conditioning factor for the implementation of 
different decentralization practices that aim at avoiding coordination failures [see 
e.g. McAfee and McMillan (1998) and Lindbeck and Snower (2000)]. Equally 
important, the shape of the hierarchies evolves and can also be the direct or 
indirect result of strategic choices of organizations [see De Fraja (2004), and 
Yanes, Ng, Tang, Beard, (2005), henceforth YNTB (2005)]. More than a decade 
ago, Radner (1992) proposed that the study of the issues involved in hierarchical 
organization of firms could be categorized according to two main approaches. In 
the decentralization of information strand, the economic literature explores the way 
optimal hierarchies minimize the costs of information processing and 
communication [e.g. Keren and Levhari (1979), Radner, op.cit., Bolton and 
Dewatripont (1994)]. The decentralization of incentives approach is based on 
agency and contract theory (especially multi-agent moral hazard models) after the 
pioneering work of Williamson (1967) on hierarchies and loss of control. Other   3
important references related to this rapidly growing literature, can be obtained in 
Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, chapter 8 and part IV), where the authors entertain 
the themes of the choice of institutions, the design of decision-making rules and 
the allocation of control rights [see also Hart and Moore (2005)].   
  On the other hand, in the empirical literature only a handful of papers have 
emerged in terms of reduced form econometric studies. Delmastro (2002) 
investigated the determinants of management hierarchy taking as reference a 
sample of Italian manufacturing plants. The study considered variables related to 
size, production technology, network technology, managerial innovation, 
ownership status and industry characteristics. The evidence was generally 
consistent with the comparative statics’ signs expected from theory, though those 
implied predictions are not always clear cut. In a related study based on the same 
data source, Colombo and Delmastro (2004), investigated the determinants of the 
delegation of authority. The evidence indicated that the complexity of plants’ 
operations and organizations, the characteristics of communication technologies in 
use, the ownership status and the product mix of the parent companies are 
particularly relevant in explaining the delegation of decision power. In a panel data 
study, Rajan and Wulf (2003) found evidence that organizations are becoming 
flatter, with authority being pushed down the hierarchy. 
  In the present paper, we intend to further investigate the scarcely studied 
topic on the explanatory factors affecting the management hierarchy. The study is 
undertaken for industrial firms in Brazil and one can highlight some motivating 
aspects that delineate the contribution of the paper, which are:  (a) The 
consideration of a large developing economy with an industrial sector 
characterized by the co-existence of modern and traditional segments. Indeed, an   4
eventual significant role for family-run firms can lead to non-economic departures 
from optimal hierarchical structures in addition to those pertaining state ownership. 
The heterogeneity of the Brazilian industry can provide an interesting environment 
for analysis; (b) The availability of a large and unique data base that allows to 
further explore the role of modern organizational practices and some forms of 
incentive mechanisms that are likely to reduce the need of worker monitoring; and 
(c) An interval measurement for the number of hierarchical levels that enables the 
consideration of econometric methods for count data instead of the potentially 
limiting ordinal level of measurement previously considered. 
  The paper is organized as follows. The second section discusses 
conceptual aspects that can clarify the determination of the hierarchical structure 
of a firm. The third section discusses the data and presents the empirical results 
associated with the empirical model. The fourth section brings some final 
comments. 
 
2. Management hierarchy: conceptual aspects 
  As we suggested in the Introduction, despite the growing concern of the 
economics literature with the main object of our study, we are still far away from a 
structural empirical model of hierarchies. Consequently, and taking also into 
consideration the great technical sophistication of the pertinent models, there is a 
need to collect and organize some relevant approaches and predictions that can 
be helpful to the following empirical exercise (Section 3). 
  The starting point of our brief survey will be the seminal paper of Williamson 
(1967), which is extended and carefully examined by Calvo and Wellisz 
(1978,1979), Qian (1994), Martin (1993) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).  One   5
of the main purposes of Williamson´s treatment is to examine the relationship 
between the decisions taken by bounded rational managers and firm´s hierarchical 
structure. He (see also Martin op.cit.) takes into consideration a firm with height m 
in terms of the number of layers in the firm, denotes by s the span of control, that 
refers to the number of employees associated to each supervisor, and by α the 
control loss parameter that does not vary with the layer. Qian, op.cit. assumes that  
α declines down the layers, and the αh  are the object of choices by 
supervisors/employees. Therefore, firm output Y can be specified by Y = θ (αs)
m-1, 
being θ an average productivity parameter, α in the top layer is equal to 1, and  
 s
m-1 denotes the layer of workers where production takes place. Naturally, as 
stressed by that author, the benefit of fewer levels is associated to smaller 
cumulative losses across the hierarchy, and its costs are related to (i) the reduced 
effectiveness of monitoring/supervision as the result of increased span of control, 
and (ii) the higher efficiency wages needed to induce employees to work (see 
below). The results that follow are worked out (with different emphasis) by the 
authors cited above, but at the cost of some simplification we will put them in the 
form of summarizing expected results, being the first two of them reference 
conjectures, that are: 
Expected Result 1 (Williamson, Martin): In a competitive setting with price-taking 
firms the profit maximizing value of m, the number of layers rises as the 
profitability in relation to wages rise and as the control loss parameter α rises. 
Expected Result 2 (Williamson, Martin, Qian): In a competitive setting, the profit 
maximizing value of m raises with s, the number of employees associated to a 
given supervisor. More generally, the number of layers rises with (profitability) and 
scale, given by the number of workers in the lowest layer.   6
  At this point some brief comments should be made about the costs incurred 
by the hierarchy. In fact, for Williamson, s does not vary along the levels, nor α, but 
it is not difficult to relax these assumptions to follow recent traditions. Following 
Bolton and Dewatripont, op.cit., we could take s
m-1 to be equal to N, and s indexed 
by the level such that sh would equal the number of employees at  level h + 1 
divided by the number of employees at  level h. Take φ to be an increasing 
function in effort αh with α in the first level equal to one (the principal does not incur 
in loss of control). With a two layers hierarchy, it can be shown that the efficiency 
wage that would give incentives to employees at the bottom layer not to shirk 
would be equal to w1 =  φ (α1) N. With a three layers hierarchy, w2 =  φ (α2) N/sh , 
which means that a lower wage would be paid to lower levels employees, what is 
in accordance with one of Williamson`s assumptions (see Martin, op.cit.). That is, 
when the principal gets more supervisors, he reduces his span of control, the loss 
of control and the wage per supervisor in the intermediate layers, having however 
to pay more to supervisors to avoid them to shirk. This wage inequality structure is 
a general result that emanates from the body of literature we are examining. It is 
important to stress that the size of the firm is directly associated to s and therefore 
a positive expected effect on hierarchy accruing from firm size naturally emerges. 
However, the lack of appropriate information in our data base recommends that 
we go to the next proposition, which follows: 
Expected Result 3 (Martin, McAfee and McMillan):  In an oligopolistic setting, 
where firm structure is also treated as endogenous, the number of hierarchical 
layers decrease as the number of firms increase. That is, the number of layers 
would increase with concentration.   7
This proposition also suggests that a firm with a long hierarchy may not 
survive more competitive pressures in output market. One of the reasons for this 
prediction is that (see McAfee and McMillan, op.cit., for extensions and related 
literature on influence costs) private information in lower levels and the associated 
bargaining power of middle-range managers result in diseconomies of scale 
(“Rents must exist for a long hierarchy to be viable”).   
   In a recent study, YNTB (2005), explored the endogenous determination of 
firm structure. Even in a competitive setting, firms could insert the hierarchy as an 
argument of the production function. That is, the organization of the hierarchy   
determines output.  Firm inputs are measured in terms of the height of he 
hierarchy (its vertical dimension) and the span of control (in a CES production 
function) assuming that workers at different levels perform different tasks, in such 
a way that an increase in the elasticity of substitution corresponds to a decrease in 
task specialization - decrease in intra-firm specialization - division of labor occurs 
in a lesser extent. In particular, technologically intensive sectors are characterized 
by high intra-firm specialization. The study lead us, among other important results, 
to the following result: 
Expected Result 4 (YNTB): When tasks are segmented by levels, the firms tend to 
become less hierarchical as intra-firm specialization declines, and the firms will 
expand both vertically and horizontally when output price rises. More specifically, 
technologically intensive sectors are expected to be more hierarchical than sectors 
where intra-firm specialization is low.  
  Given the heterogeneous nature of our data base (see Introduction), those 
conjectures may be subjected to some qualifications that are, it should be 
stressed, explicitly beyond the scope of YNTB paper. Based on extensive   8
empirical literature, Lindbeck and Snower (2000), LS, [see also Milgrom and 
Roberts (1990)] take us to the realm of evolving organizational forms, and to the 
role of multi-task learning on the reorganization of work. In fact, one of their key 
concepts is that of “blurring of occupational boundaries”, which encompasses 
capital deepening and capital widening. When workers are allowed to acquire 
more skills and variety of skills, newer forms of organization tend to promote multi-
task learning, the complementarities among tasks and the decentralization of 
decision making. If we interpret, as the authors and Hart & Moore (2005) do, the 
decentralized organization as the one where it is likely that a decision will be made 
by a specialist rather than by a coordinator, our summary device may be 
applicable, and an additional proposition follows: 
Expected Result 5 (LS): Managerial innovations (for example, Total Quality 
Management, Just-in-Time) promote the learning across tasks, and the 
decentralization of decision making (decrease in the number of layers) where 
employees perform a wider variety of tasks . 
  This proposition supported and amplified by the analysis of Keren and 
Levhari (1979), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), who point out that advances in 
communication technology lead to flatter organizations. Expected Results 4 and 5 
and the previous comments also  allow us to qualify the puzzle properly stressed 
by Delmastro (2002), who confronts these points of view with that of Lazear 
(1995), who predicts that reductions in the costs of communication promote 
specialization and hierarchy (layers are associated to tasks). Our reconciling 
reading, is that when declines in communication costs tend to promote both 
specialization of workers in specific tasks the reliance on large hierarchies follows.   9
But when multitasks are fostered, flatter hierarchies are to be expected. We think 
that the point deserves a particular proposition, that follows: 
Expected Result 6 (KL, BD): Reductions in the costs of communications (intra-firm 
and inter-firm) reduce the likelihood of a plant choosing a multi-layered structure. 
 Following    Lindbeck and Snower, op.cit., Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1994),  
McAfee and McMillan, op.cit., and Delmastro (2002), we will now make explicit our 
final proposition, that gives a link to previous comments.  
Expected Result 7 (LS, MM): The introduction of computerized information and 
communications systems is associated to the decentralization of decision making, 
to team work, job rotation and multitasking, leading supervision to be more closely 
tied to ex-post performance. In particular, corporate reorganizations pushed by 
competitive pressures make pay to be more closely related to performance.  
Altogether, the results just summarized enable to have a better notion on 
the possible expected signs of the coefficients of the reduced form model 
considered in section 3.2. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
3.1-  Data construction 
 
    The basic data source of the study is the extended survey carried out by 
Fundação SEADE for firms in the state of São Paulo [Pesquisa de Atividade 
Econômica Paulista-PAEP]. Even though, data is essentially available in terms of 
a cross-section for 1996 (with the exception of a few variables), it is worth 
mentioning the wealth of information in terms of organizational practices. That kind 
of information is rarely available and the same occurs with the advertising data   10
used in this study. Our sample includes 6578 manufacturing firms classified at the 
4-digits level after considering some omissions. This survey has mostly a census 
character as that was the case with firms in São Paulo with headquarters in that 
state. For firms with headquarters situated outside the state a sampling procedure 
is undertaken for firms with at least 30 employees. In order to implement the 
survey Fundação SEADE considered list of firms from the Brazilian bureau of 
statistics [IBGE] and administrative reports from the Ministry of Employment and 
Labor{Relação Annual de Informações Sociais-RAIS]. The former source is a 
comprehensive and reliable source for the existent firms as any formal enterprise 
is required to report basic information regarding employment and educational level 
of employees unless one is willing to pay heavy fines. It is important also to stress 
that the segment of the sample that possesses a census character is highly 
dominant in the case of the industry questionnaire of the PAEP. In fact, the firms 
with headquarters in the state of São Paulo are responsible for 81.5 % of the 
employment of all firms established in that state according to IBGE. Finally it is 
worth mentioning the importance of the manufacturing industry in São Paulo with 
respect to Brazil. Taking as reference information from IBGE [Pesquisa Industrial 
Annual-PIA-IBGE] one can indicate in 1996 a participation of 51.57% relative to 
the total of Brazilian manufacturing industry when the criterion is values added. 
When one considers total employment, the relevant figure is 48.71 %. The 
previous comments indicate that, despite the sampling procedure present in part 
of the survey, the present data base appears to be representative of the 
manufacturing industry.   11
        Next, we describe the variables considered in this study, classified by large 
categories:
1 
. HIE: number of hierarchical levels in the firm; 
 
Structural characteristics 
. SIZE: total number of employees; 
. CONC: industrial concentration as measured by the Herfindahl index at the 4-
digits level (HH = ∑i i s




. TQM: assumes value 1 if the firm adopts total quality management, and 0 
otherwise; 
. JIT:  assumes value 1 if the firm either adopts internal just-in-time, and 0 
otherwise; 
. KAIZEN: assumes value 1 if the firm adopts improvement groups practices, and 
0 otherwise. Those practices had been defined as a new production philosophy 
integrated to TQM programs and is based in the introduction of continuous and 
permanent improvements in the production processes; 
. SCP:  assumes value 1 if the firm adopts statistical control of processes, and 0 
otherwise. It is believed that SCPs preceded the adoption of TQM in Brazilian 
firms (see below). 
                                            
1  Unlike Delmastro (2002), we did not have access to information on ownership status. 
Nevertheless in the year of 1996 the only Brazilian industrial sector with important state 
participation in production was oil refining that was excluded from our sample.   12
Technological innovation 
.  R&D: number of employees allocated to R&D activities divided by the total 
number of employees; 
Network technology 
. MICRO: number of microcomputer per employee; 
. INTER: assumes value 1 if the firm has access to the Internet and 0 otherwise; 
. INTRA: assumes value 1 if the firm has access to local exchange networks (e.g. 
LAN networks) and 0 otherwise; 
 
Incentive mechanisms 
. PSHAR: assumes value 1 if there exists a profit sharing mechanisms for 
employees and 0 otherwise; 
. TRAIN: assumes value 1 when the firm offered courses in managing techniques,  
total quality control methods and in languages to blue collar workers. 
The summary statistics of the different variables are presented in table 1 
and indicate a significant degree of heterogeneity in the sample. 
   13
Table 1 
Summary Statistics (No. of observations: 6578) 
 
Variables Minimum  Maximum Mean  Std.  deviation
HIE  1.00 10.00 3.22  1.75 
SIZE  1.00 20159.00  168.49 654.10 
CONC  0.00 1.00 0.16 0.17 
R&D  0.00 0.23  1.58E-03  7.08E-03 
MICRO  0.00 1.00 0.11 0.11 
INTRA  0.00 1.00 0.45 0.50 
INTER  0.00 1.00 0.87 0.33 
TQM  0.00 1.00 0.61 0.49 
JIT  0.00 1.00 0.75 0.43 
KAIZEN  0.00 1.00 0.81 0.39 
SCP  0.00 1.00 0.60 0.49 
PSHA  0.00 1.00 0.68 0.46 
TRAIN  0.00 1.00 0.94 0.23 
 
 
3.2- Empirical results 
  The main results from the econometric estimates are presented in tables 2.  
For completeness, we also present the results related to the ordinary least 
squares estimation, though the discrete nature of the dependent variable is better 
approached by means of count data models. Moreover, unlike previous evidence 
that had to rely on data with ordinal features, we can fully take advantage of count 
data models in the present study. 
2  Examples of applications include the number 
of visits to doctors and to recreational facilities. Applications in the context of 
Industrial Organization are relatively uncommon and are exemplified by the work 
of Hausman et al (1984) 
The most traditional model in the context of count data is the Poisson 
model, where the (conditional) probability mass function of y given x is provided 
by: 
                                            
2  Cameron and Trivedi (1998) provide a comprehensive overview of econometric methods for 
count data models. Wooldridge (2002, 2003) are also important references.   14
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Further, as usual, one considers a link to explanatory variables as given by 
β µ
' ) ln( i i x = , where x is the vector of characteristics and β the vector of parameters. 
However, that model embodies the potentially limiting assumption of the mean 
being equal to the variance, that is, var( / ) ( / ) yx Eyx = =  µI = exp( β
'
i x ), an 
assumption that is often violated in applied works. In that sense, the estimation of 
the Poisson model is a possibly preliminary step in the .analysis.  The Negative 
Binomial - NB model is a more general model that allows to test the significance of 
the overdispersion parameter α, made explicit below. For the NB model as in that 
more general framework one has: 
i x y E µ =   and 
2
i i x y Var αµ µ + =                      (2) 
Even though count data models acknowledge the discrete nature of the 
dependent variable, often more specialized models are required. In fact, zero 
truncation often arises in different contexts. In the present study on the 
determinants of hierarchy truncation at zero is clearly an issue. The conditional 
density function for a left -truncated model is given by: 
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where h(.) stands for the untruncated distribution whereas H(.) refers to the related 
cumulative distribution. The choice of Poisson or Negative Binomial specification 
for h(.) would define the particular truncated count model under consideration  and 
of course r=1 in our particular application. 
The results are presented in table 2 and all estimations were implemented 
with Stata 9.2. It is interesting to observe that the estimates for the zero truncated   15
negative binomial-ZTNB and the zero truncated Poisson-ZTP were identical. In 
fact, the negligible value of the overdispersion parameter provides a strong 
support for considering the referred truncated Poisson model as the preferential 
specification as the estimation of the ZTNB model led to α = 1.50E-07.  Gurmu 
(1991) and Gurmu and Trivedi (1992) had advanced tests for overdispersion in the 
context of truncated count data models. A difficulty was related to the non-validity 
of standard regularity conditions of maximum likelihood estimators at the boundary 
of the parameter space. In that sense, the software Stata considers an adjusted 
likelihood ratio test for α = 0 as suggested by Gutierrez et al (2001). This modified 
test statistic is distributed a 50:50 mixture of a 
2
0 χ (point mass at zero) and a 
2
1 χ . 
In the present application one could not reject the null hypothesis of α = 0 and 
therefore we confidently consider the ZTP model as that adjusted test statistic was 
2
01 χ  = 5.4E-05 with p-value = 0.497.    16
Table 2: Determinants of Hierarchical Structure – Econometric Estimates (No. of 
observations: 6578) 
 


























































    
 Adj  R





Note: p-vales are indicated in parentheses where the related standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity; Poisson model was estimated by maximum likelihood   17
 
  The evidence is to a great extent consistent with the previously advanced 
theoretical results. From a more specific statistical point of view the results are 
appealing. There is a good overall fit as indicated by the coefficient of 
determination and a broad range of significant coefficients with meaningful signs. 
Therefore, we think that those with more meaningful coefficients should be 
associated to our expected results. Our results follow: 
  Expected Result 1 constitutes general reference that cannot be directly 
highlighted by the results. That is not the case with expected results 2 and 3. 
Results 2 and 3 point out that the number of hierarchical levels increases with size 
and concentration.  
Result 4 deserves a special attention, as it suggests that technology 
intensive sectors tend to become more hierarchical. In the present study its 
empirical counterpart lies in the coefficient of R&D. The referred coefficient is in 
fact positive and statistically significant. 
A partial compatibility occurs between expected result 5 and our managerial 
innovations variables. It is worth mentioning the significant negative effects 
emerging from TQM, SCP and KAIZEN that would be consistent with the 
reasoning by LS. In the case of JIT (a variable that includes internal just-in-time), 
however, one obtains also a negative but in that case non significant coefficient
3.    
Expected Result 6 is strongly supported by the results related to MICRO, 
INTER and INTRA, as far as the signs of the coefficients are concerned. They all 
indicate (with highly significant coefficients) that the introduction of micro-
                                            
3 Professor David Kupfer pointed up to us that it is a well known fact that at the date our information  
was collected the Brazilian industry was just introducing Total Quality Methods, and that the 
statistical control methods preceded the more broadly adoption of TQM.    18
computers, intra-firm and inter-firm communications systems contribute to the 
decrease of hierarchical levels.  
Finally, the support for the role of incentive mechanisms is partial. TRAIN, 
that we take as an indicator of incentive mechanism and of multi-tasking 
improvements exhibits a negative but non significant coefficient whereas our 
indicator of profit sharing with employees, PSHA, exhibits expected negative sign 
in the light of expected result 7. 
Despite individual significant effects, it is important to have a sharper 
portrayal of the hierarchical structure by considering the impact of selected 
categories of explanatory factors. For that purpose, we consider Wald type tests 
for different groups that are partially similar to those considered by Delmastro 
(2002) and are reported in table 3.  
 
Table 3: Determinants of hierarchy-joint significance Wald tests for selected 
categories of explanatory variables 
 
Group of variables  Test statistic  p-value 
Managerial innovations     
TQM, JIT, KAI, SCP  χ
2(4) = 123.61  0.000 
Network technology     
INTRA, INTER, MICRO  χ
2(3) =  254.28  0.000 
Incentive mechanisms     
PSHA, TRAIN  χ
2(2) = 51.51  0.000 
Structural characteristics     
SIZE, CONC  χ
2(2) = 34.16  0.000 
 
 
First, we consider a group of structural variables (comprising both firm and 
sectoral level data). Unlike the aforementioned author, this group included a firm-
level structural variable as given by the firm size and concentration. The evidence 
indicated that as a group the referred variables do play a significant role.   19
    In the group of managerial innovations, we considered not only more 
traditional practices like total quality management (TQM) and just-in-time (JIT) but 
also improvement groups (KAIZEN) and statistical control of processes (SCP). 
Nevertheless, in contrast with the previous evidence, there are relevant effects of 
modern organization practices as a group in explaining hierarchical structure. 
  In the group of network technology, we include in addition to the Internet 
(INTER) and Intranet (INTRA) access variables previously considered in the 
literature, a variable indicating the availability of microcomputers relative to the 
number of employees (MICRO). In fact, the actual utilization of the network 
presupposes an adequate access to IT equipments. In this case the evidence is 
very strong in the sense of indicating a strong joint effect of those variables in 
explaining hierarchical structure and is consistent with the previous evidence. 
   An additional category included in this study refers to incentive mechanisms 
that can mitigate the need for closer monitoring. In that category, we included a 
more indirect element as given by training to personnel not related to production 
(TRAIN) and a direct factor referring to the prevalence of profit sharing with 
employees (PSHA). The evidence with that respect is encouraging, as those 
variables are significant as a group.   20
4. Final  comments 
The paper undertook an econometric investigation on the determinants of the 
hierarchical structure in Brazilian manufacturing industry in 1996. In broad terms 
one can highlight categories of explanatory factors relating to structural 
characteristics, network technology, technological innovations, managerial 
innovations and Incentive mechanisms. All those, indeed exerted a significant joint 
effect in explaining hierarchical levels. The results are therefore stronger than 
those in the previous related literature. If one considers the variables individually, a 
strong tendency to more hierarchical levels is detected, together with some 
consistent indications of decentralization and fewer hierarchical layers. Moreover, 
a significant joint effect is associated with the group of newly considered incentive 
mechanisms variables.  Taken individually, these last variables point in the 
direction of more decentralized structures in Brazilian industry firms. 
As a whole, the analysis of the effects associated with individual variables 
was largely consistent with theoretical predictions from the hierarchy literature. 
Nevertheless, different routes for future research appear to be relevant. First, the 
reduced form character of the analysis should be followed at some stage by 
structural econometric investigations that are yet absent in this particular context. 
In particular, the data used in the present study was not updated. Second, the 
assessment of complementarities among the different organizational practices and 
incentive schemes is a topic of related interest that is in the front line of the 
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